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Abstract
This paper explores a variety of perfect being theism that combines Yujin 
Nagasawa’s maximal God thesis with the view that God is not atemporal. We argue 
that the original maximal God thesis still implicitly relies on a “static” view of 
divine perfections. Instead, following the recent re-evaluation of divine immutability 
by analytic philosophers, we propose that thinking of divine great-making proper-
ties (omnipotence, omniscience etc.) as fluctuating but nevertheless remaining maxi-
mal either for every time t or across all times strengthens the original maximal God 
thesis. Furthermore, we show that “temporalising” Nagasawa’s maximal God and 
adopting what we call the fluctuating maximal God thesis provides more effective 
ways of responding to objections to perfect being theism, in particular, the argument 
from evil and some conceptual problems pertaining to the Incarnation. Finally, we 
demonstrate that our proposal is compatible with Christian Scriptures and coheres 
with numerous biblical passages better than Nagasawa’s original proposal does.
Keywords Maximal God · Perfect being theism · Immutability · God and time · 
Problem of evil
Introduction
Yujin Nagasawa (2017) has recently proposed a radical thesis—the maximal God 
thesis—to overcome many of the objections to perfect being theism:
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Maximal God thesis = God possesses the maximal consistent set of the great-
making properties power, knowledge, and benevolence.
One potential problem with Nagasawa’s account is in explaining how such a con-
cept of God can overcome all objections while retaining the precise unique set of 
these attributes. We propose that perfect being theists can respond to this problem as 
well as all the objections the maximal God thesis is supposed to defuse by denying 
that the degrees of the great-making properties composing the maximal set are nec-
essarily the same at each point in time. We postulate a “fluctuating maximal God”—
a God whose degrees of power, knowledge, and benevolence may change over time 
as long as the set of these is maximal in its axiological value.
Perfect being theism and the maximal God thesis
Based on the premise that “God is the being that has the maximal consistent set of 
knowledge, power, and benevolence” (Nagasawa 2017, p. 104), Nagasawa’s maxi-
mal God differs radically from traditional versions of perfect being theism. Although 
it retains the idea that God is the greatest metaphysically possible being, this 
“Neo-Anselmian” approach rejects the inference from this claim to the idea that God 
has knowledge, power, and benevolence to their intrinsic maxima (Nagasawa 2017, 
p. 93; Amini 2016). A major advantage of the maximal God thesis is that it can 
respond to traditional attacks on perfect being theism simultaneously—by replacing 
the omni God thesis (i.e., the thesis that God possesses the individual great-making 
properties to their intrinsic maxima) with the more modest claim that God is perfect, 
or unsurpassable, insofar as God possesses the maximal consistent set of power, 
knowledge, and benevolence. Moreover, Nagasawa is quick to emphasise that the 
maximal God thesis remains impartial about whether or not God is an omni God: 
the two theses are fully compatible.
Discussing his motivations for the maximal God thesis, Nagasawa constructs a 
classification system that categorises the abundance of objections that have been 
posed against perfect being theism. The objections can be sorted into three types: 
“arguments that purport to show the internal incoherence of God’s individual prop-
erties’ (Type-A); ‘arguments that purport to show the mutual inconsistency between 
God’s properties’ (Type-B); and ‘arguments that purport to show the mutual incon-
sistency between the set of God’s properties and a certain fact about the actual 
world’ (Type-C)” (Nagasawa 2017, pp. 82, 84–5). Type-A arguments aim to dem-
onstrate that the individual properties God possesses are internally inconsistent. 
Arguments such as the classic paradox of whether God can create a stone that He 
cannot lift fall into this category. Type-B arguments aim to show that the entire set 
of God’s properties is mutually inconsistent. The question of whether an omnipo-
tent God, who is also omnibenevolent, could torture children, for example, fall into 
this category. Type-C arguments aim to show that the attributes God possesses are 
inconsistent with some states of affairs that obtain in the actual world. The problem 
of evil is one example of an argument of this type. Defenders of perfect being theism 
have thus far attempted to rebut objections such as these on what Nagasawa refers to 
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as a “case-by-case” basis. This tactic involves refuting every objection that is raised 
to perfect being theism individually. Nagasawa suggests, however, that this is not 
the most resourceful tactic available to the perfect being theist: “[t]he most obvi-
ous problem with the case-by-case approach is that, whether or not the individual 
responses to these arguments ultimately succeed, it is not very efficient as a defence 
of perfect being theism.” (Nagasawa 2017, p. 90) Once we have effectively sorted 
arguments against perfect being theism into types A, B, and C, we might consider 
what assumption they all share in common. If there is such an assumption and the 
perfect being theist can reject it, then she can defeat all three types of arguments at 
once.
Employing this strategy, Nagasawa schematises arguments of every type in one 
more general argument:
(1) If perfect being theism is true, then the perfect being thesis is true.
(2) If the perfect being thesis is true, then the omni God thesis is true.
(3) If the omni God thesis is true, then God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and 
omnibenevolent being.
(4) There cannot be an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being.
(5) Therefore, the omni God thesis is false.
(6) Therefore, the perfect being thesis is false.
(7) Therefore, perfect being theism is false. (Nagasawa 2017, pp. 91–2)
 To construct a forceful and efficient defence against any argument of this form, 
Nagasawa explains, we need only reject (2): that is, we can remove the omni God 
thesis from the equation, therefore freeing perfect being theism from the shackles of 
the omni properties.
Nagasawa also addresses several large objections to the maximal God thesis in 
turn. One main objection he considers runs as follows:
One might reject my maximal God approach by saying that it is unreasonable 
to think that there is a single combination of knowledge, power, and benevo-
lence that undermines all Type-A, Type-B, and Type-C arguments against per-
fect being theism. For example, it might be the case that perfect being theists 
need God to have more knowledge and less power in response to one argument 
but more power and less knowledge in response to another. (Nagasawa 2017, 
p. 106)
According to this objection, the onus is on the maximal God theist to demonstrate 
how certain degrees of power, knowledge, and benevolence can defeat every signifi-
cant objection to omni God perfect being theism.
This objection is not unrelated to another problem: The maximal God thesis 
seems to invite polytheism. In order for a being to qualify as God, it must have the 
highest combined knowledge, power, and benevolence compossible. Imagine that 
one being has 29 units of great-making properties in total: 9 of knowledge, 10 of 
power, and 10 of benevolence. A second being might have 10 of knowledge, 9 of 
power, and 10 of benevolence and so simultaneously qualify as God; a third might 
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have 10 of knowledge, 10 of power, and 9 of benevolence (Nagasawa 2017, pp. 
110–111). Nagasawa offers the following defence regarding polytheism: It could be 
the case that only one combination of degrees of great-making properties can yield 
the sum of 29. Additionally, the different great-making properties might have dif-
ferent axiological values such that the simple sum of degrees of great-making prop-
erties does not actually identify the overall greatness of the being. However, this 
response to the polytheism objection could exacerbate the first objection regarding 
one unique specification of great-making properties dealing with all three types of 
objections to perfect being theism. For example, stipulating that one great-making 
property, like benevolence, holds more axiological weight than the other limits pos-
sible responses to certain Type-C arguments. It commits the theist to the idea that 
God cannot anticipate what a hate-filled dictator will freely choose to do, and so that 
God has the power to stop such a villain from committing genocide.
In the next sections, we argue that Nagasawa’s main idea, when combined with 
the thesis that God is temporal and in some way mutable, could avoid these criti-
cisms more effectively and offer many of the benefits promised by the maximal God 
thesis.
Fluctuating maximal God
Putting Nagasawa’s thesis aside for the time being, observe that perfect being theism 
has traditionally tended to include on its list of divine attributes not only omnipo-
tence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence, but also immutability. Divine immuta-
bility in the strong sense (the claim that God does not undergo any changes what-
soever, be it changes of His nature or mere “Cambridge” changes) has frequently 
been coupled with the idea of God being timeless (as opposed to God being everlast-
ing, i.e., existing through time but simply never beginning to exist or never ceas-
ing to exist (Swinburne 2016, p. 228)). Nevertheless, recent years have also seen 
the development of arguments for rejecting or downgrading divine immutability and 
timelessness to preserve logical coherence (see for example Mullins 2016), parallel 
to Nagasawa’s project of redefining the core of perfect theism by modifying the tra-
ditional tripartite omni God thesis. Many reasons for regarding traditional timeless-
ness with suspicion have been cited: its incompatibility with divine personhood or 
causality in time, to give just two examples. Although we suspend judgement about 
which of the two options of framing God’s relation to time outlined above (tempo-
rality/atemporality) is the better one, they both seem to be live options in contempo-
rary scholarship.
Now, suppose, for the sake of argument, that a perfect being theist might have 
independent reasons to reject strong immutability. Furthermore, observe that the 
picture of the maximal God proposed by Nagasawa leaves completely undecided the 
temporal indexication of the maximally consistent set of great-making properties. 
When does God possess the maximally consistent set of properties? Does He pos-
sess these in eternity? Do we simply gather the information we have about God’s 
nature and His dealings with the world and then, at the end of time, calculate the 
contents of the maximal set? Or is He greatest at every moment in time? In fact, 
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the picture that emerges from Nagasawa’s proposal is one of God possessing the 
maximal set of great-making properties timelessly and/or immutably, in somewhat 
of a static manner—a picture not explicitly affirmed by Nagasawa, but perhaps still 
lurking in the background, smuggled in as a residue of traditional perfect being the-
ism. The original maximal God could, therefore, be designated as a “static maximal 
God” (SMG).
Denying Nagasawa’s SMG, we propose the “fluctuating maximal God” (FMG) 
thesis, which can be summarised as follows: the degrees of divine knowledge, 
power, benevolence (and perhaps others) fluctuate in the course of time, while their 
sum, nevertheless, remains maximal. Such a definition leaves open what the specific 
degrees of individual properties are at particular times or whether one great-making 
property has more axiological weight than others. At t1 God’s knowledge can be 
greater than at t2, if this, for example, allows for God to be more benevolent at t2 
than at t1. We, therefore, can accept the idea that there is not a “single combina-
tion of knowledge, power, and benevolence that undermines all Type-A, Type-B, 
and Type-C arguments against perfect being theism” while holding that the maximal 
God strategy does enable one to defend perfect being theism from all three types of 
arguments.
Prima facie, one might protest that the value exhibited by a being cannot vary 
simply by time because temporal location alone can never be a basis for a norma-
tive difference. If the degree of one of God’s great-making features fluctuates, what 
motivates the fluctuation? We contend that facts about the world are the catalysts for 
these fluctuations. There are two options to explain the causal relationship between 
God’s fluctuations and facts about the world. The first is that facts about the world 
cause God to change in the way that the fact of seeing a lion causes one to feel 
afraid; God may have a constant disposition to respond in appropriate ways to cer-
tain events such that the occurrence of those events activates the disposition. The 
second is that facts about the world are related to the degrees of God’s attributes 
by a necessitating logical relation in the way that a decrease in the speed of a car 
“causes” an increase in the time it takes to travel a distance.
Let us be clear when we say that although God’s overall value is intrinsic, the 
great-making attributes themselves are relationally valuable.1 So, although the 
degrees of each attribute that constitute the axiological value do change, God’s 
1 It is important to note that by “intrinsic value” we mean final, or non-instrumental, value (rather than 
an extension of the Lewisian formula “in virtue of itself and nothing else”). Otherwise, assuming a 
Lewisian meaning of “intrinsic” and applying it to value, one might worry that a relational value would 
thereby fail to be intrinsic. The proposal under consideration states that God possesses properties that are 
intrinsically valuable—valuable for their own sake and not for the sake of anything else. The degree to 
which God possesses any of these given properties at a point in time will depend on what is valuable in 
relation to states in the actual world. Thus it is not that the property possesses value only relative to us, or 
some fact about the world, but that the property possesses final or intrinsic value and the degree to which 
the greatest possible being will possess that property at a time does depend on the facts in the world. Fur-
thermore, the issue of how to quantify the perfections in the first place is not a problem specific to our 
conception of the fluctuation of individual great-making properties; the onus of explaining the nature of 
these trade-offs is on the defender of the original SMG thesis.
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overall axiological value—or absolute greatness—does not change. So the fluctua-
tion of degrees does not entail a fluctuation of worth.2
How does our proposal fare with regards to the objections that Nagasawa’s SMG 
was supposed to resolve in the first place?
First, unsurprisingly, temporalising the maximal God thesis leaves intact its abil-
ity to rebut Type-A arguments. Maximal God theism says that God is always the 
greatest metaphysically possible being, where members of the set of God’s great-
making properties are individually metaphysically possible at the very least. Again, 
this constraint operates if God is in time as well. On this version, we simply say that 
God is the greatest metaphysically possible being and so at each time t, the great-
making features God possesses at that time must meet this requirement of metaphys-
ical possibility. It should also be noted that our view, strictly speaking, does not even 
require God’s features to fluctuate; the FMG permits these fluctuations but does not 
demand them. If it turns out that the best combination of properties is the same at all 
times, then so be it.
Equally, the power to respond to Type-B arguments also remains unaffected: the 
FMG allows (but does not require) there to be different configurations of great-mak-
ing properties at different times. In the absence of facts about the world affecting the 
composition of the maximal set—for otherwise the Type-B argument would qualify 
as a Type-C argument which we will turn to shortly—it is not obvious what would 
actually motivate these fluctuations. In any case, they are not disallowed by the 
FMG and all of their numerous re-combinations are still constrained by the consist-
ency requirement. Even though—again, in the absence of facts about the world—the 
maximal God theist might not need this feature of the FMG, it is there as a theoreti-
cal possibility, carried over from the SMG and multiplied by being indexed to every 
time.
However, the FMG does make a crucial difference to the mutual consistency 
of two or more attributes once we factor in facts about the world. This brings us 
directly to Type-C arguments, where the FMG offers immense argumentative power. 
According to one Type-B argument Nagasawa mentions (Nagasawa 2017, p. 85), 
God’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence are mutually incompatible. For if God 
is all-loving, God cannot sin or wrong other persons. This obviously places a con-
straint on what God is able to do, that is, God’s power. Thus the opponent of the 
Anselmian omni God concludes that such a God does not exist. Nagasawa can avoid 
this by ratcheting down the degree of God’s power such that it is compatible with 
the highest degree of love. Now compare two beings: the first being is such that its 
degrees of power and love never fluctuate and the second is such that its degrees of 
2 Under this model, God is necessarily the greatest possible being. So, when a fact about the world indi-
cates that God’s great-making features’ degree(s) must fluctuate, then God must change accordingly to 
continue being the greatest possible being. We can schematise this view as follows:
 (1): God is the greatest possible being.
 (2): At time t God must change to remain the greatest possible being.
 (3): So God must change at time t.
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power and love can fluctuate.3 Now, throughout time there will be changes in the 
world on which the opportunity for God to sin supervenes. To simplify, say that for 
every act that God cannot perform, God’s power is lowered one degree. For each act 
of sin God cannot perform, then, we lower God’s power a degree. The first being 
will have its degree of power for each time fixed by the sum of all the acts it cannot 
perform throughout time, whereas the second being could have a very high degree 
of power at times where there is no opportunity to sin and a lower degree of power at 
times where an act of sin is available but not possible for that being. So, which being 
is better? It seems plausible that the second one is better. For over the course of its 
career it has had higher degrees of power. For instance, if there is a stretch of time in 
which no human persons exist, no acts of sin involving wronging of human persons 
are available. Thus there is no possibility at those times that the second being cannot 
actualize, and in virtue of which it lacks a degree of power. At those times, the being 
will have much more power than the first being, whose degree of power is fixed by 
all the future times at which human persons do exist and afford chances for sins of 
wronging them.
In more abstract terms, Type-C arguments take one or more facts from the totality 
of facts about the actual world and show that such facts are incompatible with per-
fect being theism. At a purely conceptual level, observe the following:
(1) Type-C arguments are used to show the incompatibility between the set of God’s 
great-making properties and a certain fact about the actual world.
(2) The particular combination of God’s great-making properties is, on the FMG 
thesis, dependent on facts obtaining at times of the actual world.
(3) The actual world exists in time, i.e., every fact about the actual world4 obtains 
at a particular time.
This means that, in a way, any potential incompatibility advanced by the opponent 
of the SMG thesis between a particular combination of God’s properties and a fact 
about the actual world is, itself, related to a particular time t. Recall again the objec-
tion discussed by Nagasawa that “it is unreasonable to think that there is a single 
combination of knowledge, power, and benevolence that undermines all Type-A, 
Type-B, and Type-C arguments.” Now, on the temporal version of maximal God 
theism, we need not accept that God displays a single combination of knowledge, 
power, and benevolence. But a Type-C argument will posit that some combina-
tion of power, knowledge, and benevolence is required due to facts about the actual 
world, and these facts will be indexed to a particular time. More specifically, the 
facts about the actual temporal world that figure in Type-C arguments are indexed to 
3 For the time being, put to the side the fact that if this ability to fluctuate is a power, it would make the 
second being greater vis à vis degrees of power.
4 Our discussion excludes general facts that obtain at all times (e.g., the fact that there is no Santa Claus, 
which is true at every time t of the actual world), since, by their nature, they are included in every set of 
facts at every time t and thus do not make a difference to the maximal set at every time t.
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times and so the validity of the arguments will depend on premises that index God’s 
properties to times.
Schematically, an objector to perfect being theism argues:
(1) The world is x way at t.
(2) The world’s being x way is incompatible with the existence of the omni God.
(3) Therefore, the omni God does not exist.
A more perspicuous argument will say, in premise 2, that the world’s being x 
way at t is not compatible with the existence of the omni God at t, so the omni 
God does not exist at t. Similarly, she may argue more perspicuously against the 
SMG thesis:
(1) The world is x way at t1.
(2) The world’s being x way at t1 is incompatible with the existence of a being that 
has the maximal consistent set S of power, knowledge, and love.
(3) Therefore the being with the maximal consistent set S does not exist at t1.
The FMG thesis leaves open the possibility that “the perfect being theists need 
God to have more knowledge and less power” in order to achieve maximal consist-
ency with one fact about the world at t1 and at the same time “more power and less 
knowledge” in order to achieve maximal consistency with a different fact about the 
world at t2. And so the defender of the FMG thesis can accept (2) and (3) from 
above while concluding that God may still exist, for God may be the being that has S 
at t2 but a different combination of degrees of great-making properties at t1.
Ultimately, the FMG thesis is significantly more effective against Type-C argu-
ments than the SMG thesis by claiming that contingent facts about the world can 
actually fix how God’s great-making properties combine. Let us take the argu-
ment from evil to illustrate this. This argument, like all Type-C arguments, differs 
from Type-A and Type-B arguments because it does not focus on a solely logical 
issue of God’s internal properties (which, for Nagasawa, are necessary and fixed). 
Nagasawa claims that the SMG theist need not worry about the problem of evil 
(or Type-C arguments in general) unless the contingent world facts seem hugely 
incompatible with God’s nature:
The maximal God approach is in danger only if the argument from evil 
shows that the quantity and quality of evil in the actual world are so sig-
nificant that we have to “compromise” God’s knowledge, power, or benevo-
lence to the extent that He can no longer be the being than which no greater 
is metaphysically possible. (Nagasawa 2017, p. 115)
Nagasawa thus places the onus on the Type-C arguer to provide examples of 
evil that are this extreme. Yet it seems that such examples do exist, examples in 
which reducing God’s power to explain great evil in the world would render Him 
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extremely weak. Nagasawa’s response is to claim that at least the SMG thesis can 
account for evil more readily than the omni God thesis because:
Showing the quantity and quality of evil in the actual world are so significant 
that we have to “compromise” God’s knowledge, power, or benevolence to 
such an extent is more demanding than showing that they are so significant 
that we have to “compromise” God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibe-
nevolence. (Nagasawa 2017, p. 115)
Nagasawa ultimately admits that the SMG thesis might not be able to defeat the 
problem of evil without appealing to certain theodicies. Unlike the SMG theist’s 
response, which is limited and relies on conjecture, the FMG thesis can offer a 
strong response to Type-C arguments like the problem of evil because it allows that 
contingent facts independent of the nature of God can affect God’s attributes at one 
time, but they act as temporary metaphysical constraints on any being. So at any 
time, God refers to the axiologically best being in that world.
Greatest at every time or greatest career?
Before moving further, we need to return to an important ambiguity regarding the 
original formulation of the FMG. Recall that we defined the FMG as the claim that 
“the degrees of divine knowledge, power, benevolence (and perhaps others) fluctu-
ate in the course of time, while their sum, nevertheless, remains the same.” How-
ever, this formulation does not distinguish clearly enough between the following two 
claims:
Claim 1: The degrees of divine knowledge, power, benevolence (and perhaps oth-
ers) fluctuate in the course of time, while their total sum for the totality of all times, 
remains maximal.
Claim 2: The degrees of divine knowledge, power, benevolence (and perhaps oth-
ers), fluctuate in the course of time, while their total sum for every single time 
remains maximal.
The first claim can be designated as the “greatest career” approach; God does not 
have to be greatest at every single point of time, but, once His values for all times 
are added up, He “ends up” being the greatest. The second claim simply says that 
no matter what point of time we look at, and how many beings existing at that time 
we consider, God will always clearly come out as being the greatest. Claim 2 entails 
Claim 1 (since if God is greatest at every time, He is also greatest once these times 
are all added up), but not the other way around. Which one of these should the fluc-
tuating God theist adopt?
Let us consider Claim 1 first and then observe if we gain any advantages by 
strengthening it to Claim 2. Claim 1 preserves the entire strength of Nagasawa’s pro-
posal. It simply specifies that its scope concerns all points of time conjointly. One 
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of its rather troublesome consequences, however, is that it is in principle compatible 
with there being a time at which God is not the greatest possible being and thereby 
strengthens Nagasawa’s original problem with polytheism. Whereas for the SMG 
thesis, the problem is that the maximal set may be exhibited by more than one being, 
for our proposal, this problem is multiplied, since there is a single maximal set like 
this for every point in time. At every point in time t, there exists a (different) possible 
world in which there is a being with a maximal set relative to t but this maximal set 
consists in a different combination of degrees of the great-making properties. How 
can we guarantee that this is always the same being? We see at least three ways to 
respond to this problem:
First, we may simply concede that this is exactly the same problem that the origi-
nal SMG thesis faces. Since our aim was not to find a response to every objection 
to Nagasawa’s SMG thesis, but instead to consider resources for strengthening it in 
some respects, this problem simply ends up being carried over into the FMG thesis 
too. If the SMG thesis faces this problem, and our proposal “temporalises” Him, it 
should not be surprising that the problem itself reappears in a “temporalised form.”
The second option is to concede that those different possible beings at different 
times are all God. But since the FMG thesis speaks about states of affairs maximally 
consistent with facts obtaining at times t in the actual world, what happens in those 
possible worlds does not matter. If those possible worlds were actual, then the facts 
about the actual world would be different and so would the identity of the fluctu-
ating maximal God. But possible worlds are merely possible so what happens in 
them does not matter. It has no significant bearing on what God is actually like, just 
like the counterpart of Hubert Humphrey who wins a presidential election in a far-
off possible world does not matter for what Hubert Humphrey is actually like (Felt 
1996, pp. 63–77; Kripke 1981; Lewis 2002; Robson 2011, pp. 55–75).
Thirdly, (and this is our preferred response), the problem might be neutralised by 
claiming that it is simply a semantic issue. To formulate this problem in a Kripkean 
language, the term “God” (or in our case, “fluctuating maximal God”) is a rigid des-
ignator which refers to God, i.e., the being that has the maximal sum of great-making 
properties for all times conjointly. “God” can designate God, even if God changes, and 
even if a definition applying to the totality of times does not apply to Him at individual 
times. More importantly, it does not matter whether there is an actual being at time t 
with a higher degree of greatness than God since God is the greatest for all times. One 
may still be the healthiest member of a given group of people (and referred to as “the 
healthy one”) even when one is caught secretly smoking a single cigarette while the 
other compulsive smokers happen to be munching away on their salads. This move 
seems particularly desirable since it is available to the defender of the FMG thesis 
but not of the SMG thesis. Consider the following example. At time t1 (say, at the 
time of the Flood), the degree of the maximally consistent set possessed by God is 
27, and this set is exhibited by God. At time t2 (yesterday afternoon), the maximally 
consistent set is 29 and is again, exhibited by God. However, at t2, the set amounting 
to 27 is exhibited by Archangel Gabriel. Does this mean that at t1, it was the case that 
Archangel Gabriel would become God at t2? Certainly not. The FMG thesis simply 
provides details of what is true of the being referred to by the rigid designator “God” 
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at different points in time.5 At t2, God is still God, what happens at t1 does not matter, 
since at t2 the maximally consistent set is not the one exhibited by Archangel Gabriel.
How about Claim 2, i.e., regarding the FMG as attaching to every single time? We 
have been unable to find ways to make this stronger version of the FMG thesis coher-
ent. There are two primary difficulties with Claim 2. First, on this reading, it seems very 
difficult to ensure that God be the greatest possible being at every time t other than by 
fiat. How can we guarantee that Archangel Gabriel in the previous example would not 
qualify as “God”? And how can we guarantee that the situation described by the Arch-
angel Gabriel example does not, in fact, obtain? Of course, the adherent to the Claim 2 
version of the FMG thesis might raise the following methodological point: The SMG 
and FMG are intended to serve merely to shift the burden of proof onto the opponents 
to the maximal God approach—so one might envision sticking to Claim 2 and simply 
stating that the burden of proof is on the atheist to show that Archangel Gabriel on the 
scenario described earlier qualifies as God. While this is certainly true and the possibility 
of the Archangel Gabriel scenario obtaining does not destroy the coherence of the FMG 
qua Claim 2, it does seem to be an unwelcome consequence which FMG qua Claim 1 
does not invite. If the FMG theist has other reasons to accept Claim 2 (although we do 
question these reasons, see below), then the Archangel Gabriel problem does not per 
se threaten the coherence of the FMG; but all other things being equal, the Archangel 
Gabriel consequence is avoided on Claim 1. Secondly, one might also run into difficul-
ties trying to define what the “time” to which FMG is now supposed to attach, actually 
is: If “time” is understood as the “smallest unit of time,” if there is such a thing (e.g., a 
chronon), then the FMG must be related to every single such unit of time. If “time” is 
understood as a temporal interval, the FMG can be limited either to a particular short 
interval (“the time of the Flood”), to a set of such intervals (“Israel’s wanderings in the 
desert”), or, indeed, the interval stretching from the beginning to the end of time, which, 
in effect, means that Claim 2 converts itself to Claim 1.6 The metaphysical consequences 
5 One might also object that it could be true of someone else at a different point in time. For example, it 
might happen that at t2 Archangel Gabriel exhibits the set with a total degree of 50, thus being maximal 
at t2. The rigid designator “God” would thus pick out a being whose degrees of great-making properties 
were not maximal at t2. There are prima facie three ways this objection may be responded to. First, the 
FMG thesis is a version of perfect being theism, therefore it does not permit the existence of a being 
greater than God for purely theological reasons—reasons quite independent of the formalisation of the 
FMG thesis itself. Second, the FMG thesis should be regarded as a description of God, not as a defini-
tion; we are therefore not making a claim about it providing necessary and/or sufficient conditions for 
divinity, but merely as giving details as to what God is like—details that the maximal God theist may 
then use in responding to all the various arguments against perfect being theism. Third, the response 
may be articulated in an Anselmian fashion in terms of God being “unsurpassed” and/or “unrivalled.” 
We may argue, for instance, that although Gabriel’s having a greater overall degree of great-making 
properties at one moment in time means God is “rivalled,” it does not mean that He is surpassed since 
Archangel Gabriel is not a maximal being at every time t.
6 It might be argued that this worry is simply the result of formulating Claim 2 on the supposition that 
time is discrete instead of being continuous and that the problem can simply be resolved by reformulat-
ing Claim 2 in terms of “always” (as opposed to “at every time”). If we assume that “always” does not 
simply mean “the totality of all times” (otherwise it would simply be equivalent to Claim 1), the problem 
with indexing the degrees to the smallest units of time (e.g., chronons) indeed disappears. However, the 
problem of indexing these degrees to different intervals—for both continuous and discontinuous time 
admit of distinct intervals of different lengths—still remains and we can still legitimately worry about 
God being greatest at every (single) interval of time.
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of each of these options are also even further complicated by the fact that each of the 
formulations of “at the same time” would need to be relativised to a particular frame 
of reference and combined with a suitable temporal ontology: is Archangel Gabriel 
greater than God in one reference frame but not as great in a different one where God 
has already performed a particularly great action? Things could get messy. By contrast, 
sticking to Claim 1 gives the FMG theorist the possibility to either adopt an eternalist 
ontology of time (God is greatest with regards to the entirety of the spacetime block) or, 
if she wishes, the freedom to come up with ways to make Claim 2 coherent.
However, if the FMG theorist wishes and is able to make Claim 2 coherent, one 
might wonder why she might want to do so. Surely, allowing the possibility of there 
existing a being greater than God at certain points of time—implied by Claim 1—is 
a slightly weird consequence, but perhaps not so much weirder than having a pos-
sible being at every point in time implied by Claim 2. At some points in time, fur-
thermore, it may be part of the divine providential plan to allow there to be a being 
greater than He is at those points in time. Such an option would not be available 
if we adopt Claim 2. Finally, the consequence of allowing there to be “short-term 
greater” beings than God in no ways affects the type of greatness for which God is 
worshipped: in the same way as a short bout of flu does not prevent us from ascrib-
ing invincible strength to an Olympic athlete. In view of the fact that there are no 
tangible advantages of Claim 2 over Claim 1 and the difficulties the articulation of 
Claim 2 is fraught with, we propose limiting FMG to the weaker Claim 1.
Incarnation, evil, scripture
Apart from preserving the strength of Nagasawa’s SMG, the FMG also adds further 
and more powerful ways of responding to other problems which are more theologi-
cal in nature. Typically, the perfect being theologian must offer different responses 
to questions, such as: How is the Incarnation logically possible? Why does God per-
mit certain observed evils? and How do we reconcile perfect being theology with the 
picture of God as He is portrayed in Scripture? It is not clear that the typical answers 
exhibit any serious unity or coherence. For example, the perfect being theologian 
might defend a two-minds view to make sense of apparent logical inconsistencies 
in the doctrine that Jesus is God (e.g., that He is both limited in power, given His 
human nature, and unlimited in power, given His divine nature), but the two-minds 
view does not afford any solution to the problem of horrendous evils. Obversely, in 
order to respond to the problem of evil, a perfect being theist might argue that being 
omnibenevolent does not entail having a requiring reason to promote the well-being 
of every creature; but this argument does not give her any resources to solve the 
problems of logical inconsistency in the Incarnation or to explain God’s apparently 
fluctuating emotional responses to the Israelites wandering in the desert (Murphy 
2017, pp. 70–75). For these, she might have to adopt a free-will defence and a par-
ticular hermeneutical lens for interpreting the Bible.
This by itself is not a mark against such views. But it shows that such per-
fect being theists will trade simplicity in their account of the divine perfections 
for complexity elsewhere, especially in defending distinctively Christian views. 
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While someone could complain that the FMG thesis adds unnecessary complex-
ity to the picture of the divine perfections, this complexity could be a fair trade 
for theoretical power and simplicity when it comes to responding to challenges to 
Christian theism. If all one needs to answer these various challenges adequately is 
the FMG thesis, the theory, on the whole, will be more parsimonious.
Can the FMG thesis offer a response to the argument from evil? On the SMG 
thesis, we have to hold fixed whatever adjustment to the degrees of divine power, 
knowledge, and benevolence we make to explain the compossibility of God’s 
existence and the presence of evils in the actual world. Suppose the defender of 
the SMG thesis says that God’s power to prevent evils is limited while God’s 
benevolence and knowledge are dialled up to the intrinsically highest degrees. 
Let us grant that any creature with more power than this would necessarily have 
less benevolence or knowledge. Now, add to this the observation that evils seem 
to differentially impact different persons, or even the same person through time. 
If God’s power to limit those evils remains the same throughout time, why does 
God appear to intervene and prevent some evils and not others, when it looks like 
prevention would require roughly the same degree of power in those cases? For 
instance, God’s degree of power, compossible with benevolence and knowledge, 
enables God to eliminate the Egyptian Pharaoh and his army during the Exodus; 
it is, then, unclear why those same degrees of benevolence and knowledge would 
not be compossible with a degree of power that would enable God to eliminate 
Hitler and the Nazi German army in World War II. The dialling down of some 
degree of a great-making feature must be consistent with both the evidence of 
evils that occur and evidence of divine prevention of other evils. If observed evils 
and prevented evils do not form a regular pattern, one easily explicable by the 
particular degree set of divine power, knowledge, or benevolence, this will detract 
from the power of the SMG thesis to allow a theist to respond to the problem of 
evil.
The FMG thesis circumvents this issue. For on the FMG thesis, we are free to 
claim that the degree of some great-making property fluctuates over time, as long 
as it is part of the maximal set of great-making properties composing God’s entire 
career. At the time of the Exodus, God’s power is dialled up to a high enough degree 
that God may part and re-gather the Red Sea. Perhaps the degree of God’s knowl-
edge is limited at this time, but this does not affect God’s successfully saving Israel. 
We can imagine that, due to there being few metaphysical possibilities of harm 
coming to Israel immediately following the swallowing up of Pharaoh’s army, God 
can base His plan to bring Israel to safety on a wager, using probabilistic beliefs 
instead of knowledge. Thus God cedes knowledge in order to gain power. We can 
tell another story for the case of Nazi Germany. Imagine the many battlefronts and 
enormous numbers of people involved make it important that God have more com-
prehensive knowledge to act wisely. Thus God sacrifices power to gain knowledge, 
and so fails to prevent some present evils to Jews and Allies. But perhaps if God had 
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retained more power and abdicated knowledge, God would have exerted great force 
to do something where the probability of a worse disaster was fairly high.7
The attentive reader now can anticipate what we will say about the Incarnation. 
The FMG thesis fits well with a Christology on which the Second Person of the 
Trinity, the Son, genuinely sacrifices some degree of attributes such as knowledge in 
taking on human nature, even if only temporarily (Evans 2009; Forrest 2000).
Notice that contemporary kenoticism, which has seen revival of interest among 
Christian scholars, fits with the FMG thesis quite naturally. Contemporary kenoti-
cists claim that the Second Person of the Trinity gives up some degree of power 
and knowledge, out of love, in order to assume a human nature. Instead of saying 
that the Second Person loses the divine attributes, we can say that the degree of the 
Second Person’s knowledge, power, or benevolence changes throughout the life of 
Christ. The Second Person might exhibit love to the intrinsic maximum because He 
has need of fellow human persons, is physically engaged with them, and sacrifices 
degrees of power and knowledge for the sake of uniting Himself to human nature for 
our salvation. If that intrinsic maximum is sufficiently high, then the Second Person 
could have very low degrees of knowledge and power while still achieving the maxi-
mal sum required by the FMG thesis.
It should come as no surprise that kenoticism coheres with the FMG the-
sis; increased comfort with the idea that “God does indeed change in signifi-
cant respects, but never in contradiction to God’s character,” as one author puts it 
(Thompson 2006, p. 106), paved the way for the revival of kenotic theology, and 
also motivates our exploration of the FMG thesis. And in fact, kenotic theologi-
ans can respond to Type-C objections to perfect being theology in virtue of certain 
divine attributes being temporally indexed. Pawl has shown that kenotic theology 
also has the resources to avoid the logical objection to the Incarnation by insisting 
on the irreducibility of tense in the copulas joining certain predicates to the Second 
Person (Pawl 2016). The kenotic theologian ought to say, according to Pawl, that the 
Second Person was impassible and is passible, and that from this conjunction we 
cannot derive the logical contradiction that the Second Person is both impassible 
and passible (Pawl 2016, p. 177). In sum, the FMG thesis should have special appeal 
to the Christian theist with sympathy for kenoticism. For the FMG thesis suggests a 
broader framework for thinking about divine attributes that makes sense of their way 
of understanding the record of Christ’s earthly life as well as their preferred solu-
tions to the logical problem with the doctrine of the Incarnation (See Morris 1989).
7 It might still be objected that there is something odd about a theory which asserts that God intention-
ally fluctuates His relevant attributes in such a way that He can be excused from allowing evil instead of 
preventing it. However, the example above serves merely as an illustration of how to make the different 
facts at different times compatible with the degrees of great-making properties. We do not here give a 
theory which would explain the grounds for the fluctuations; they might be intentional exercises of divine 
agency or contingently necessary responses to facts in the world given the maximal greatness of God 
(see above). The aim of the FMG is simply to provide a coherent story about how the fluctuating facts 
about the world cohere with great-making properties. That’s all that is needed to respond to the opponent 
of perfect being theism.
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Objections and replies
Nevertheless, despite the advantages outlined above, one might find two strong 
objections against our view. First, one might object that changes in the degrees of 
the various divine perfections would require an exertion of God’s power. But it 
seems possible that at t1, the degree of God’s power is so low that God cannot effect 
an increase in power at t2. How might the defender of the FMG thesis avoid this 
rather worrying possibility?
One possible response is to stipulate that God’s power never dwindles to so low a 
degree that God loses the power to change the degree of the divine attributes at the 
next moment in time. Suppose each unit of God’s power corresponds to a power to 
perform a particular action. What the defender of the FMG thesis must say, then, is 
that God’s power never falls below a certain minimal level and that the power repre-
sented by the baseline level is the power to change the degree of God’s great-making 
properties.
Another possible response is to say that God does not exert any power to affect 
the fluctuation in degrees of the great-making properties. One sense in which the 
FMG thesis might show that God is maximally great is that God exhibits all the 
possible combinations of great-making properties to differing degrees throughout 
human time. If God does this according to a plan, then the plan and overall power 
through time could together explain the fluctuations in degrees of properties, from 
the top-down, rather than the explanation for any given fluctuation being the proper-
ties possessed by God at the prior human time.
The second objection we want to consider is that our view is axiologically unmo-
tivated: surely whatever being this is should not qualify as God, for it is not great 
enough.8 The God of traditional theism, following Anselm, should be unsurpassable, 
such that no other being we can imagine is greater than God. But we can imagine, 
and in fact, have imagined, a being greater than the being described by the maximal 
God and fluctuating maximal God theses, namely, a being which possesses each of 
the great-making properties to their intrinsic maxima. Both the SMG and the FMG 
theses go astray in making a positive claim about the limitations on the great-mak-
ing properties God has upfront, rather than stipulating that God will be greater than 
anything we can imagine and forcing us to push on preconceptions about metaphysi-
cal and logical possibility.
The former approach begins with a filled-out picture of the great-making prop-
erties or the maximal set. If someone rejects the picture in favour of another, she 
simply ends up endorsing a different conception of God. The result is that views 
of the conception of God, what it denotes, proliferate, and in response to certain 
objections we end up saying, “Well I just disagree about what God is.” On the latter 
approach, we need only a very rough and ready picture of great-making properties 
to begin with and a broad consensus on how to make comparative judgments about 
the axiological value of such properties. As more arguments bring our attention to 
8 We are grateful to Mark Murphy for raising this objection.
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great-making properties or ways of thinking about them—what constitutes more 
power, more benevolence, more knowledge—we might then fill out the picture. But 
when we disagree, the disagreement is not about what God is but what is more valu-
able—what perfection in benevolence, or knowledge, or power consists in.
The FMG thesis may seem attractive to many precisely because they do not share 
axiological intuitions that have been taken for granted as though part of a broadly 
shared standard. It seems that literature by modern perfect being theologians 
assumed that immutability and impassibility, for instance, would make for a bet-
ter rather than a worse kind of being. We simply mention here that many defend-
ers of immutability and impassibility have not given arguments for this axiological 
assumption. Further, some theistic traditions regard a responsive and passible being 
as better than a being that is stoically unchanging. One upshot of considering the 
FMG thesis is that it invites us to focus more attention on arguments for hitherto 
unstated axiological assumptions about the greatest possible being.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that regarding Nagasawa’s maximal God thesis through the 
lens of the recent move away from the timeless God provides more effective ways of 
responding to objections directed at perfect being theology. We have argued that the 
fluctuating maximal God thesis increases the explanatory power of Nagasawa’s pro-
posal. We believe that the FMG thesis provides new groundwork not only for artic-
ulating the relationship between divine attributes and time but also for furthering 
Nagasawa’s methodology of responding to arguments against perfect being theism.
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